In this paper I document that highway construction firms in California, particularly those owned by Blacks and Asians, exhibit considerable racial segregation in that they are disproportionately located in zip codes with the greatest concentration of own-race residents. I find that segregated firms serve a larger market than minority-owned firms that are not segregated, and this effect is concentrated in Black-owned firms. I next exploit the segregation of firms to examine the effect of affirmative action on the success of minority-owned firms. Following the significant curtailment of affirmative action in California due to a direct statewide ballot initiative, the number of highway construction establishments located in zip codes with the highest concentrations of Black and Asian residents fell relative to the rest of the state, even conditional on the number of non-construction establishments. This suggests that affirmative action policies may play a role in the net survival rates of minority-owned firms.
Introduction
Segregation along racial lines is a common feature of the organization of cities, and this pattern of racial segregation tends to be highly correlated with the location of economic disadvantage within a city.
As a consequence, racial segregation has been an important area of study for those trying to understand racial gaps in measures of economic wellbeing. Much of the focus has centered on the location of employment within a city in relation to the location of racial and ethnic enclaves. The so called spatial mismatch hypothesis, first advanced by Kain (1968) , suggests that minority unemployment may in part be due to geographic patterns of employment and residence, where minorities are segregated into central cities while employment opportunities are concentrated in suburbs. 2 Encouraging business ownership among minorities, potentially through affirmative action programs, may help alleviate this problem if minority-owned firms locate near minority population centers. Establishing the impact of affirmative action on minority firms is an important part of the current policy debate due to the recent curtailment of affirmative action programs through the courts and voter initiatives, and due to the potential cost of these programs (see Marion, forthcoming) .
In this paper, I investigate the location of minority-owned firms in the highway construction industry, and how affirmative action may affect the success of firms located in neighborhoods with the highest concentrations of minority residents. Highway construction and repair is an important public procurement market that makes intensive use of affirmative action programs. In 1998, states awarded $14.6 billion of construction and repair contracts using federal funds, of which $1.9 billion was awarded to firms owned by minorities and women. In addition, most states and many counties and cities also use affirmative action to direct locally funded projects to firms owned by minorities and women.
I first utilize the directory of disadvantaged business enterprises (DBEs) that are pre-qualified to perform work on California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) road construction and repair projects. I find that the location of firms in this industry closely corresponds to patterns of residential location by race -black-owned firms are disproportionately likely to locate in zip codes with higher concentrations of black residents, Hispanic-owned firms are disproportionately likely to locate in Hispanic areas, and so forth. 3 I will refer to this pattern as firm segregation. 4 The extent to which this segregation affects the success of firms owned by minorities is an important question. 5 By locating in minority areas, firms may limit their access to capital and to prime contractors.
On the other hand, own-race networks may be positive factors in firm success. Firms may face discrimination in terms of obtaining business, leasing land, and forming networks in predominantly white neighborhoods. Furthermore, common cultural ties can make enforcing informal contracts easier.
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To investigate this, I examine the breadth of a firm's capabilities as measured by the number of districts in which the firm is prequalified to perform work. I find that black-and Hispanic-owned firms are able to serve smaller areas than Asian-and white-owned firms. Interestingly, segregated minorityowned firms, those located in zip codes with high own-race population concentrations, are able to serve larger markets than non-segregated firms. Furthermore, the effect of segregation on firms' market size is uneven among races. Segregated Black-owned firms experience a significantly positive segregation effect, while segregation has a much smaller and statistically insignificant effect on the capabilities of firms owned by Hispanics and Asians. Since firm location is an endogenous variable, this may explain why black firms experience a greater degree of segregation.
3 The zip code may not be the ideal level of geography to evaluate racial segregation since its boundaries may match poorly with those of racial neighborhoods. I prefer this level of geography here since the findings related to firm segregation will aid in the interpretation of the results where I examine establishment counts at the zip code level. 4 While I will use the term segregation to describe the location of firms in own-race neighborhoods, the evidence I will present suggests that firms locate in areas that are only disproportionately comprised of own-race residents. For instance, black-owned firms are far more likely to locate in areas where at least 20 percent of the population is black than are other firms. However, more than half of black-owned firms locate in zip codes where less than 20 percent of the population is black. 5 For a detailed discussion of factors affecting the success of black-owned businesses, see Fairlie and Robb (2007) . 6 For instance, Gil and Hartmann (2007) examine dry cleaners located in Los Angeles' Koreatown, finding that drycleaners with Korean speaking owners are less likely to be vertically integrated. This suggests that the costs of using the market are lower for firms with access to the social network. Other papers that consider the importance of social networks for business formation and success include Davidsson and Honig (2003) , Kalnin and Chung (2005) , Rauch (2001) , and Shane and Cable (2002) .
Having established that minority-owned firms do tend to locate in areas with a greater composition of minority residents, this paper lastly examines the effect of affirmative action on firms in minority areas.
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I use the implementation of California's Proposition 209, which eliminated the consideration of race and gender in the awarding of state contracts, to provide evidence on the effect of affirmative action on minority businesses and economic activity in minority neighborhoods. I focus in particular on highway construction establishments, as firms in this industry derive most of their revenue from public projects and are therefore the most subject to policies in public procurement. Using data from the Zip Code Business Patterns, I find that the initiative's implementation coincided with a decline in the likelihood of zip codes in the fifth quintile of the Black and Asian population distribution having a highway construction establishment of 2.6 and 2.1 percent, respectively. I find that zip codes in the fifth quintile of the Hispanic distribution, in contrast, saw an increase in the likelihood of having an establishment. The racial location of Hispanic-owned firms is more evenly spread across the Hispanic population distribution, which may help explain this finding.
Highway procurement is a useful setting for examining affirmative action for several reasons. First, work performed by firms in the highway, street, and bridge construction industry was for government owned projects. As a result, changes in public procurement policy will have a strong effect on firms in the highway construction industry. This will ease the burden placed on the data, as drawing inference regarding the effect of affirmative action on a given firm in the highway construction industry will provide more power than making the same inference regarding a firm in the broader construction industry While affirmative action has been found to increase the utilization of minority-owned firms in procurement (for instance Marion, 2008) , its effects on business success and firm formation and survival have proven difficult to assess. Bates and Williams (1996) examine data from the Characteristics of Business Owners, utilizing a question in this survey that asks responding firms the revenues they derive from selling to the government. They find that minority business owners who rely heavily on government contracts are more likely to fail between 1987 and 1991. Blanchflower and Wainwright (2005) utilize data from the Current Population Survey to examine whether self-employment rates among minorities and women were lower after federal affirmative action programs were weakened by the case of City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that race-conscious programs must meet strict scrutiny requirements establishing a compelling need for the program and that the program is narrowly tailored. They find that self-employment rates among minorities and women were not significantly different post-Croson, despite the fact that many local affirmative action programs ended during this time. Chay and Fairlie (1998) examine cities' adoption of affirmative action programs in procurement, finding that Black self-employment rates rose dramatically in adopting cities. In contrast, Fairlie and Marion (2008) find that eliminating affirmative action in California and Washington was in fact associated with an increase in minority self-employment rates in those states. This is perhaps due to those affirmative action programs also applying to labor markets, so their elimination may have lowered the opportunity cost to business formation.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background information on highway procurement in California and Caltrans' affirmative action program. Section 3 describes the data that will be used; section 4 presents the results, and section 5 concludes.
Until March of 1998, the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) set a statewide goal for the participation of DBEs on state highway construction, which it met by applying a DBE subcontractor participation goal on a project-by-project basis. To qualify as a DBE, a firm must meet two requirements:
an ownership requirement that at least 51 percent of a business must be owned by the group for which the goal applies, and an operations requirement that the minority or female owners be involved in the day-today operation of the business. One other important feature of the executive order is worth mentioning. Only contracts funded entirely by the state were affected, since eliminating affirmative action would potentially place funding from federal sources in jeopardy. This is an important aspect of the road construction industry, as approximately half of the contracts awarded by the state used federal funds (Marion, forthcoming) .
Therefore, Proposition 209 did not fully eliminate affirmative action in California; it only significantly curtailed its use. Furthermore, affirmative action was not fully eliminated at other levels of government.
For instance, the city of San Francisco continued to use race conscious affirmative action programs at least until a court ruling found it violation of Proposition 209 in 2004.
Data

Caltrans Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Directory
Information regarding firms in this market is obtained from the DBE directory maintained by
Caltrans. Based on capabilities, firms can gain pre-qualification to perform work on certain types of projects and certain locations. This directory contains information on all firms qualified to be counted as DBEs toward fulfilling the DBE subcontracting requirement in a contract. This directory contains information on the firm's location, the work it is willing to perform, and the race of the owner. I exclude firms located outside California from analysis.
Zip Code Business Patterns
The zip code business patterns data provides the number of establishments at the five digit zip code level. Establishments simply represent the unique geographic locations of firms, and several establishments can be owned by the same firm. These data provide the number of establishments at a detailed level of industry, which will be used to identify the number of establishments specifically in the highway construction industry in a particular zip code. The data used in this paper is yearly information 
Results
Firm segregation
I begin by documenting the degree to which highway construction firms are geographically segregated along racial lines. Table 1 Furthermore, while only 10 percent of firms not owned by blacks are located in zip codes with at least a 20 percent black population, 48 percent of black-owned firms are located in these zip codes.
While black-owned firms seem to be the most highly segregated, a similar though less pronounced pattern emerges for Asian-owned firms. Asian-owned firms account for 24 percent of the firms in the directory, yet account for 55 percent of the 67 firms located in zip codes with a population that is at least 40 percent Asian. Hispanic-owned firms are less segregated by race, though some segregation is still noticeable. These firms account for 29 percent of the 1641 firms in the directory, yet account for 54 percent of firms in zip codes with a population at least 60 percent Hispanic.
One difficulty in interpreting the information in Figure 1 is that each of the cells has a different number of zip codes, making it difficult to compare across population concentrations of different races. 
Segregation and Firm Capabilities
I next examine how the segregation documented in section 4.1 correlates with firm capabilities.
Segregation may limit the business networks of minority firms, which may affect access to capital and business markets. On the other hand, locating near suppliers or contractors that share common cultural links may enhance firm performance.
I consider the number of Caltrans districts in which firms are qualified to work. Figure 2 provides a map of these districts. There are 12 districts in the state, and each district is of considerable size with the exception of district 12, which is comprised entirely of Orange County. Conditional on the type of work the firm performs, market scope is a strong indication of the firm's breadth of capabilities. First, districts are large enough that a firm serving a separate district implies a firm with a sizable market, not merely a firm that must look outside of its immediate zip code to find work. Second, distance is an important element of the highway construction market. Firms located far from a construction work site tend to bid higher than firms located close by, and distance is an important element in the market entry decision.
The goal of this section is to estimate the effect of segregation on the number of districts a firm is qualified to serve. A segregated firm is defined as one located in a zip code that is in the fifth quintile of the ownrace population distribution. The regression to be estimated is (1) where si is an indicator for a firm being segregated, and ri and q5i are a series of dummy variables indicating the race of the firm and whether the firm's location is in the fifth quintile of the population distribution of race k. Therefore, the variable si is an interaction between the race indicator and the fifth quintile indicator. I will include in this regression only firms owned by white women, and those owned by black, Hispanic, and Asian men and women. 8 The results are presented in Table 2 . In column 1, I consider a specification that only includes the set of race indicators. Compared to firms owned by white women, Hispanic owned firms serve 0.7 fewer districts and black owned firms serve 2.0 fewer districts. Asian firms serve 0.2 fewer districts, though this figure is statistically insignificant and small compared to the average of 8.6 districts.
In column 2, I present a specification that includes the segregation dummy variable, as well as indicators for being located in the fifth quintile of the population distribution of the different racial categories. We see that firms located in zip codes with the highest concentration of black residents serve 1.4 fewer districts, though firms located in fifth quintile Hispanic and Asian neighborhoods do not serve a statistically significant different number of districts. Segregation seems to be a positive factor in the capabilities of minority-owned firms. Segregated firms serve 1.1 more districts than non-segregated firms.
In Column 3, I split the effect of segregation by race, and we see that the effect of segregation is not evenly spread across races. Black firms experience a significantly positive affect of segregation, and this is enough to overcome the smaller market size they see on average. Consistent with the results shown in Columns 1 and 2, the results shown in Column 3 suggest that black-owned firms are found to serve 2.4 fewer districts than their white-owned counterparts. However, black-owned firms located in zip codes with the highest share of black residents serve an almost identical number of districts as white firms in the same areas and serve 1.1 more districts than other black-owned firms located in areas with lower concentrations of black residents. Conversely, there is no effect of segregation on firms owned by Hispanics or Asians. Furthermore, while the specification in column 2 suggested that Hispanic firms serve smaller markets than white-owned firms, once the effect of segregation is separately estimated by race, I find no difference in geographic market size between Hispanic-and white-owned firms.
It is possible that unobserved factors at the zip code level influence firm size. In evaluating the effects of segregation, much of this is captured by comparing minority firms located in minority areas with white-owned firms located in minority areas. However, the estimated effect of segregation will still be biased if the minority areas that minority-owned firms locate in are different than the minority areas in which white-owned firms locate. To account for this possibility, I include zip code fixed effects in the specification shown in column 4. The results indicate that the estimated effect of segregation for blackowned firms is not due to differences in zip code characteristics. Segregated black firms serve 2.1 more districts than non-segregated black firms. Interestingly, zip code effects are able to account for most of the size differences of white-owned firms and non-segregated black-owned firms. In the specification presented in column 4, I include controls for the firm's primary category of work. Some types of work may involve lower transportation costs, and these controls will account for any differences in the distribution of races across types of work. In this specification, segregated black firms are still estimated to experience a positive effect of locating in black neighborhoods, though controlling for work codes can account for one-third of the effect.
Affirmative action and the number of establishments
In this section, I consider the effect of affirmative action on the number of highway construction establishments in minority neighborhoods. As we saw in section 4.1, firms tend to be segregated racially.
Therefore, understanding how affirmative action affects the number of establishments may tell us how it alters the survival and formation rates of minority-owned firms. This question has proved to be difficult to answer, as data rarely allow one to observe both measures of firm success, the race of the owner, and whether a firm is a government contractor. Furthermore, obtaining exogenous changes in affirmative action is difficult. Using the Zip Code Business Patterns data, the measure of business outcomes I will use is the number of establishments in the construction industry, and more specifically the highway construction industry.
Firms in these industries are likely to sell to the government, and the average minority-owned firm in these industries will have been more strongly affected by state affirmative action programs than minorityowned firms in other industries. Affirmative action in California procurement was significantly curtailed in 1998, and I will use the timing of this policy change to identify the effect of affirmative action on businesses located in minority areas.
Examining highway construction establishments in high minority areas may under some circumstances yield direct evidence of the effect of affirmative action on minority firms. In the extreme case, if predominantly Black zip codes are comprised entirely of Black-owned firms, then any change in the number of establishments in these zip codes represents a net change in Black-owned establishments.
In the intermediate case where firms in predominantly Black zip codes are merely more likely to be Black-owned, the main assumption that is required is that white entrants are distributed geographically similarly to white incumbents. The elimination of affirmative action reduces the demand from Blackowned firms and increases the demand from white owned firms, which may induce white entry and Black exit. If the white-owned firm enters the same zip code that the Black firm exits, then even if affirmative action had an adverse effect on minority firm success it could not be detected by looking at the overall number of establishments in a zip code, even if the firms there are most often Black-owned. It is therefore necessary to assume that white entrants are distributed geographically similarly to white incumbents. This is likely a reasonable assumption here, as establishments are being measured at the zip code level, yet the relevant market in the construction industry is geographically much broader. Therefore, even if minority exit leads to entry by a white firm, the characteristics of the road construction industry do not suggest that the firm will be induced to enter the exact zip code where the exit occurred.
The empirical strategy is to compare the number of construction establishments in high-minority zip codes with that observed in other areas of the state. This can be done conditional on overall business activity in the state, which picks up any underlying shocks affecting hi-minority areas. This suggests a difference-in-difference (DD) specification of the form (2) where yit measures either the log number of highway construction establishments or the log number of construction establishments. Since only 33 percent of zip codes have highway construction establishments, one specification will also consider a linear probability model where the dependent variable is an indicator for having a construction establishment. The variable I(year≥1998) is an indicator for being in the post-Prop. 209 period, and q5i is a dummy variable indicating whether the zip code is in the fifth quintile of the distribution of either Blacks, Hispanics, or Asians. The coefficient of interest is therefore γ1, which describes the difference in establishments between hi-minority and low-minority areas, before and after the contraction in affirmative action. Unobserved differences across zip codes are captured in the zip code fixed effects, ρi, which also captures the direct effect of being in the fifth quintile of the racial distribution. Common shocks affecting all firms in a given time period are captured by the year effects, φt.
Finally, in each specification I will also control for the log number of non-construction establishments, xit, located in zip code i. Zip codes may be hit by year-to-year shocks that affect firm formation and survival, and if these shocks differentially affect minority neighborhoods and are correlated with the implementation of Proposition 209, this will bias the estimates of γ1. By controlling for the number of non-construction establishments, this specification captures unobserved factors affecting business formation at the zip code level. Therefore, for any unobserved variables to bias the estimated coefficients, they would have to differentially affect construction establishments specifically located in himinority zip codes. Controlling for non-construction establishments could introduce bias if there are firms in the non-construction sector who could also be adversely affected by affirmative action. This bias is likely to be small, since public procurement represents a small portion of the non-construction sector, and furthermore this effect will bias our estimates of γ1 toward zero and away from finding an effect. Table 3 Taken together, the results suggest that Black neighborhoods experienced a decline in the number of establishments in industries likely to serve the government, and there is evidence that Hispanic and Asian neighborhoods may have been similarly adversely affected. While Hispanic areas saw an increase in highway construction establishments post-Proposition 209, the broader construction industry experienced a decline. It is also worth repeating that Hispanic-owned firms appear to be less segregated into Hispanic neighborhoods than firms of other races, which may help explain the mixed results obtained for these zip codes.
Conclusion
This paper provides new evidence regarding the segregation of firms across racial lines in the highway construction industry. Minority-owned firms are more likely to locate in zip codes with a high concentration of minority residents. Furthermore, this segregation appears to be a positive factor in the breadth of firm capabilities, at least for black-owned firms. When affirmative action is significantly curtailed in California state procurement, we see evidence of a decline in construction establishments, and highway construction establishments more specifically, in Black neighborhoods. Furthermore, zip codes with high Asian concentrations also see a decline in the number of highway construction establishments.
However, the evidence is mixed regarding the effect of Proposition 209 on the number of establishments in Hispanic neighborhoods. This suggests that eliminating affirmative action may have an adverse impact on either the net survival rates or the size of minority-owned firms. 
